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Abstract
A major source of insurance coverage for non-elderly adults in the US is
the employer-based health insurance market. Every participant in this market
receives a tax subsidy because premiums are excluded from taxable income.
However, people have different incentives to participate in the employer-based
pool - since premiums are independent of individual risk, high-risk individuals
receive implicit cross-subsidies from low-risk individuals. In this paper, we
explore several ways to reform the tax subsidy by taking this implicit cross-
subsidization into account. Using a general equilibrium heterogeneous agents
model, we find that even though the complete elimination of the tax subsidy
leads to the unraveling of the employer-based pool, there is still room for
substantial savings by targeting the tax subsidy. More specifically, the same
level of risk-sharing in the employer-based market can be achieved at one-
third of the current costs if i) the tax subsidy is targeted only towards low-
risk individuals who have weak incentives to participate in the pool, and
ii) employer-based insurance premiums become age-adjusted. To improve
the welfare outcome of this reform, the modified tax subsidy should also be
targeted to low-income individuals.
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1 Introduction
Most non-elderly adults in the US (63%) purchase health insurance in the employer-
based market.1 An important feature of this market is community rating, i.e., the insur-
ance premiums are independent of the health and age of individuals.2 For the community-
rated market to provide good risk-sharing, there should be a significant number of healthy
people who are willing to participate. In the employer-based market, an important incen-
tive to participate is provided by tax subsidies: employer-based premiums are excluded
from federal and state taxes. However, these subsidies are costly: CBO (2015) estimates
that in 2013, the total federal cost of the tax exclusion was $250 billion, making it the
largest tax expenditures by the federal government and the third largest expenditure on
health care after Medicare ($586 billion) and Medicaid and CHIP ($463 billion).3
In this paper, we ask whether it is possible to reduce spending on tax subsidies without
destroying the employer-based pool. Our question is motivated by the observation that
every participant in the employer-based market receives a tax subsidy, but people have
different incentives to participate in this pool. The employer-based pool involves sizeable
cross-subsidization from people with low expected medical costs (young and healthy) to
people with high expected medical costs (old and unhealthy). The former group pays
more, and the latter group pays less for their health insurance than they would pay if
insurance premiums are adjusted for individual risks. As a consequence, people with high
expected medical costs have stronger incentives than people with low expected medical
costs to join the pool. Based on this observation, we explore several ways to better
target tax subsidies and evaluate the effects of these alternative subsidy schemes on tax
expenditures and risk-pooling in the employer-based market.
Our approach is based on a quantitative heterogeneous agents model developed by
1Own calculations based on the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) dataset.
2In this paper, we refer to community rating in the employer-based market to describe the health
insurance pricing within the pool of people insured by employer-based insurance. It is important to
distinguish it from the community rating for employers. The latter refers to the situation in which
different employers face the same price for insuring their workers (for example, because they are in
the same geographical region). Another pricing scheme for employers is experience rating, a situation
in which the insurance price depends on the previous history of claims. It is important to note that
even employers who face the experience rating still have to charge all their workers the same insurance
premium (as long as they buy the same plan), i.e., they cannot introduce the experience rating to the
ESHI pool.
3As defined in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, tax expenditures
are ”revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion,
exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of
tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” Tax expenditures usually are calculated with reference to the normal
tax structure. Joint Committee on Taxation defines the normal structure of the individual income tax
as the existing tax rate schedule with several standard deductions and exemptions. Apart from these
standard deductions, all other tax benefits (including tax subsidy for employer-based health insurance)
are classified as special provisions (JCT, 2015). Thus, tax expenditures are calculated as the difference
in tax revenue between the normal tax structure and the tax structure with special provisions.
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Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013). The model features medical spending shocks that
can be insured through the individual or employer-based markets. An important differ-
ence between these two markets is that in the former, the premiums are risk-adjusted,
whereas in the latter there is a community-rating, meaning that healthy and unhealthy
people are charged the same premium. People are heterogeneous in their expected medi-
cal costs, which creates different incentives to participate in the community-rated market:
people with low expected costs may prefer to buy risk-adjusted insurance (or self-insure),
while people with high expected costs may prefer to participate in the community-rated
pool. The model also captures the differential treatment of health insurance embedded
in the tax code: employer-based premiums are excluded from taxable income, while in-
dividual market premiums are not. The calibrated model reproduces the key aggregate
statistics for the US, as well as the empirical life-cycle patterns of employment and in-
surance coverage constructed based on the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
dataset.
Our findings are as follows. First, we show that if tax exclusion is substituted by a
direct subsidy that is targeted only at people with weak incentives to participate in the
employer-based pool, the costs of subsidizing people with employer-based insurance can
be decreased by 74% without any damage to the risk-sharing. To achieve this outcome,
the amount of the direct subsidy should depend on the risk-adjusted premium of each
individual. Even higher cost savings can be achieved if premiums in the group market be-
come age-adjusted, i.e., premiums can vary with age (but not with health). Since medical
costs increase quickly with age, community rating involves a sizeable cross-subsidization
from the young to the old. Therefore, a large amount of direct subsidies is needed to moti-
vate young people to participate in this pool. Allowing the premiums to be age-adjusted
reduces the size of cross-subsidization inside the pool, thus decreasing the amount of
direct subsidies needed to hold the pool together.
Second, using results from the direct subsidy scheme, we explore how to reform the
current tax exclusion in order to obtain a similar outcome. We find that the reform that
maintains good risk-sharing in the employer-based pool while significantly reducing the
tax expenditures consists of two steps: i) allowing the premiums in the employer-based
market to be age-adjusted, and ii) giving tax subsidies only to those participants of
the employer-based pool who currently have low medical spending.4 Under this reform,
the spending on the tax subsidy constitutes only a third (34.6%) of the amount in the
baseline economy and the tax rate decreases by one percentage point, while the take-up
rate of the employer-based insurance slightly increases (97.1% compared with 94.2% in
the baseline). In contrast, if tax subsidy is completely eliminated, the take-up rate goes
4Since medical expenditures are persistent, people with low current medical expenses have lower
expected expenses; thus, they drive down the average premium in the employer-based market.
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down to 6.3%. We repeat the analysis assuming that the health reform described in
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is implemented and find that the proposed tax subsidy
reform achieves a similar outcome in terms of the ESHI take-up rate and the reduction
in the total tax subsidy costs.5
Finally, our welfare analysis shows that the proposed tax subsidy reform achieves
much higher welfare gains if low-income individuals (those with income below 200% of
the Federal Poverty Line) are also allowed to keep the tax subsidy.6 This is because
the best risk-pooling is achieved when tax subsidies are targeted at low-risk individuals,
whereas the best welfare outcomes are achieved when tax subsidies are targeted at low-
income individuals.
Several studies examine the effects of the tax exclusion reform, but none of them
investigates the possibilities of targeting the tax subsidy. Gruber (2011) uses a micro-
simulation model to evaluate the effect of tax exclusion removal and finds that this reform
substantially increases government revenue yet significantly decreases insurance coverage.
Aizawa and Fang (2012) focus on firms’ decisions to offer health insurance and find that
removal of the tax exclusion slightly reduces the number of firms offering employer-based
insurance. The closest paper to ours is that by Jeske and Kitao (2009), who address this
question using a stochastic aging general equilibrium model featuring individuals who
are heterogeneous in their medical expense shocks. They find that eliminating the tax
exclusion results in a partial collapse of the employer-based market due to the adverse
selection problem. Similar to Jeske and Kitao (2009), we focus on individual decisions
related to health insurance but allow for a full life cycle. Because the difference in
expected medical expenses between the young and the old is large, the premium in the
employer-based market is very sensitive to the age composition of the pool, and thus, the
full life-cycle can better capture the risk of the unravelling of the market.
More generally, we contribute to the literature that examines the implications of
government policies related to health and the health insurance market. This literature
5It is important to draw a parallel between our proposed policy and the ACA: we suggest introducing
age-adjusted community rating in the group market while the ACA did the same for the individual
insurance market. The question of whether premiums in the individual market should be common for
all participants or be allowed to vary by age was among the debatable ones before the passage of the
ACA. One of the rationales for choosing the latter option in the final bill was that expected medical costs
(and thus insurance costs) are steeply increasing with age, thus making the young and the old pay the
same premium involves considerable cross-subsidization from the former group to the latter. Given that
older individuals usually have higher income and have accumulated more assets, this cross-subsidization
is not necessarily optimal. The same reasoning applies to our policy proposal. Given that the ACA
was passed, we believe that our proposal also is politically feasible. It is also worth stressing out the
important difference from the practice in the European countries which sometime is used as an argument
against the age-adjustment. In most European countries health insurance is universal and financed by
income or payroll taxes. There are no explicit age-adjusted premiums, but since income increases with
age, older people on average pay more into the insurance system.
6We use utilitarian criterion in our welfare analysis.
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includes Attanasio, Kitao and Violante (2011), Hai (2012), Hansen et al. (2014), Kim
(2012), Ozkan (2012), Hsu (2013), St-Amour (2012), and Zhao (2014). We also relate to
the literature that studies the life-cycle behavior of individuals in the presence of health
uncertainty, such as Capatina (2014), De Nardi et al. (2010), French and Jones (2011),
Kopecky and Koreshkova (2013), and Prados (2012).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a simple model that illustrates
the intuition behind our results. Section 3 introduces the full model. Section 4 describes
our calibration. Section 5 evaluates the performance of the baseline model. Section 6
describes the results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Simple Model
In this section, we construct a simple model to illustrate the intuition behind our
results. In this simple framework, we show how different subsidy schemes can be used to
keep together an insurance pool of individuals who are heterogeneous in their risks.
Consider a continuum of individuals who differ in their expected medical costs. We
denote an actuarial fair insurance price of an individual i by pi. Assume pi is uniformly
distributed over the interval [0, pH ], pi ∼ F (p). If all individuals participate in one
insurance pool, the price in this pool will be equal to p =
pH∫
0
pdF (p) =
pH
2
. However,
this pool is unstable because individuals with pi < p want to drop out.
7 To prevent the
unraveling, we need to introduce subsidies. First, we consider the case in which the size
of the subsidy cannot be differentiated, i.e., every individual receives the same subsidy s.
To ensure full participation, the subsidy must be equal to p to make an individual with
the lowest pi = 0 indifferent between staying or leaving, i.e., s = p. The total spending
on subsidies (TotSubs1) is equal to
TotSubs1 =
pH∫
0
sdF (p) =
p2H
2
.
This is graphically represented by the shaded rectangle in Figure 1.
Second, consider the situation in which the size of the subsidy can be differentiated. In
this case, each individual receives a subsidy si = max {0, p− pi}. Thus, only individuals
with pi < p will receive the subsidy, and the size of the subsidy decreases in pi. The total
7We assume that individuals are free to buy health insurance at risk-adjusted actuarially fair prices.
In our quantitative model, we relax this assumption by introducing a mark-up on individual insurance.
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spending on subsidies is equal to
TotSubs2 =
pH∫
0
sidF (p) =
p2H
8
.
This is graphically represented by the shaded triangle in Figure 2. Note that the total
spending on subsidies can be reduced by four times by taking into account that individuals
differ in their incentives to participate in the pool.
si
pi
pH
2
pH
2
pH
Figure 1: Total subsidy spending if everyone re-
ceives the same subsidy
si
pipH
2
pH
pH
2
Figure 2: Total subsidy spending if subsidy de-
pends on pi
To illustrate the importance of pool heterogeneity for subsidy spending, consider
another example. Assume that there are two insurance pools instead of one: people with
pi < p participate in the first pool, and people with pi ≥ p participate in the second.
The prices in the first pool (p1) and in the second pool (p2) are equal to
pH
4
and
3pH
4
,
respectively.8
Consider the total subsidy spending needed to ensure full participation in each pool.
If the subsidy is uniform, every individual in the first pool should receive a subsidy equal
to p1−0 =
pH
4
, and those in the second pool should receive p2−p =
pH
4
. Thus, the total
spending needed to keep the pools together is:
TotSubs3 =
pH
4
p∫
0
dF (p)+
pH
4
pH∫
p
dF (p) =
p2H
4
This is graphically represented by the two small shaded rectangles in Figure 3.
8These prices are determined in the following way:
p
1
=
1
Pr(p < p)
p∫
0
pdF (p) =
pH
4
and p
2
=
1
Pr(p ≥ p)
pH∫
p
pdF (p) =
3pH
4
.
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In case of the differentiated subsidy, people in the first pool receive a subsidy equal
to s1i =max {0, p1 − pi} and people in the second pool, s
2
i =max {0, p2 − pi}. The total
spending on subsidies is equal to
TotSubs4 =
p∫
0
s1idF (p)+
pH∫
p
s2idF (p) =
p2H
16
This is graphically represented by the two shaded triangles in Figure 4.
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2
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4
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4
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4
pH
Figure 3: Total subsidy spending if there are two
insurance pools and everyone receives the same sub-
sidy
si
pipH
2
pH
4
pH
4
3pH
4
pH
Figure 4: Total subsidy spending if there are two
insurance pools and subsidy depends on pi
Table 1 summarizes the total subsidy spending in the four cases considered above.
An important result is that moving from the uniform to differentiated subsidy can sub-
stantially reduce the total spending needed to ensure the full participation in the pool.
These savings arise from withdrawing subsidies from people who are willing to partic-
ipate even when they are not subsidized, i.e., people with pi > p. Another result is
that it is much cheaper to ensure full participation if there are two smaller insurance
pools instead of one large pool. This is because in the two smaller pools, people are
less heterogeneous in their risks; thus, the size of cross-subsidization from low risk to
high risk is smaller. In particular, in the one large pool, the difference in risk-adjusted
premiums between the highest and the lowest risks is pH , whereas in the two smaller
pools, it is p = pH − p =
pH
2
. Therefore, a smaller direct subsidy is needed to make
low-risk individuals willing to cross-subsidize high-risk individuals.9
9Note that as the number of pools keeps increasing, the size of subsidies required to keep the pools
together decreases, but the amount of risk-sharing achieved in each pool decreases as well. As the number
of pools approaches the number of people, everyone simply faces risk-adjusted price.
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One pool Two pools
Uniform subsidy p2H/2 p
2
H/4
Differentiated subsidy p2H/8 p
2
H/16
Table 1: Total spending on subsidies for different subsidy schemes
3 Baseline Model
The model described in this section is developed by Pashchenko and Porapakkarm
(2013). Here and in Section 4, we outline the main features of the model and its cali-
bration; we refer the reader to Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013) for a more detailed
description.
3.1 Households
3.1.1 Demographics and preferences
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals. An individual
lives to a maximum of N periods. During the first R − 1 periods of life, an individual
can choose whether to work; at age R, all individuals retire. The labor supply decision
of a household is denoted by lt, lt ∈
{
0, l
}
. Agents differ in their educational attainment
e. Educational attainment can take two values: e = 1 corresponds to the absence of any
degree, whereas e = 2 corresponds to at least a high-school degree.
Each agent is endowed with one unit of time that can be used for either leisure or
work. There is a fixed cost of work φt,e treated as a loss of leisure. Thus, a working
individual’s leisure time can be expressed as 1− l− φt,e. The fixed cost of work depends
on age (t) and education (e). In addition, individuals in bad health incur higher costs of
work: φt,e = φ1(t, e)+φ2(t, e)1{health=bad}, where 1{.} is an indicator function mapping to
one if its argument is true, and φ1(t, e) and φ2(t, e) are non-negative functions. Earnings
are equal to w˜ze,xt lt, where w˜ is wage and z
e,x
t is the idiosyncratic productivity that
depends on the educational level (e), age (t) and medical expenses (xt) of an individual.
The preferences over consumption and leisure are assumed to take Cobb-Douglas
form:
u(ct, lt) =
(
cχt
(
1− lt − φt,e1{lt>0}
)1−χ)1−σ
1− σ
.
Here, χ is a parameter that determines the relative importance of consumption, and σ is
the risk-aversion over the consumption-leisure composite.
Agents discount the future at the rate β and survive until the next period with
conditional probability ζt, which depends on age and health. The savings (net of out-of-
pocket medical expenses) of each household that does not survive are equally allocated
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among all survived agents of a working age within the same educational group. The
population grows at the rate η.
3.1.2 Health expenditures and health insurance
In each period an agent faces a stochastic medical expenditure shock xt, which evolves
according to a 5-state discrete Markov process G(xt+1|xt, t). More specifically, xt = 1 cor-
responds to the average spending at the bottom 30% of the medical expense distribution
at age t, xt = 2, 3, 4 correspond to the average spending among 30th-60th, 60th-90th and
90th-99th percentiles respectively, and xt = 5 corresponds to the average spending of
people at the top 1% of the distribution at age t.10 Individuals are categorized into two
groups based on their medical expenses. Individuals with low medical expenses (xt ≤ xt)
are referred to as “healthy”or “people in good health”, whereas individuals with high
medical expenses (xt > xt) are referred to as “unhealthy”or “people in bad health”.
Here xt is a threshold separating people into these two groups and corresponds to the
90th percentile of the medical spending distribution.11
Every working age individual can buy health insurance (HI) against a medical shock in
the individual health insurance market. The price of health insurance in the individual
market is a function of the agent’s current medical shock and age and is denoted by
pI (xt, t).
In each period with some probability Probt an agent of working age receives an offer
to buy employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI). The variable gt characterizes the
status of the offer: gt = 1 if an individual gets an offer, and gt = 0 if he does not. All
participants in the employer-based pool are charged the same premium p regardless of
their current medical expenses and age. An employer pays a fraction ψ of this premium.
If the worker chooses to buy group insurance, he only pays p where:
p = (1− ψ) p.
Low-income individuals of working age can obtain their health insurance from Med-
icaid for free. There are two pathways to qualify for Medicaid. First, an individual can
become eligible if his total income is below threshold ycat. Second, an individual can
become eligible through the Medically Needy program. This happens if his total income
minus medical expenses is below threshold yneed, and his assets are less than the limit
kpub.
10We explain more in Section A.2 in the Appendix.
11In the data, the fraction of workers among people with high medical expenses (top 10% of the
distribution conditional on age) is much lower than this fraction among people with low medical expenses.
We use health category defined in the text to capture this observation when we estimate the preference
parameters φt,e.
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The current health insurance status is denoted by it:
it =

0 ; if uninsured
1 ; if insured by Medicaid
2 ; if privately insured

All types of insurance contracts - group, individual, and public - provide only partial
insurance against medical expenditure shocks. The fraction of medical expenditures
covered by the insurance contract is denoted by q (xt, it). This fraction is a function of
medical expenditures and the type of insurance of a household.
All retired households are enrolled in the Medicare program. The Medicare program
charges a fixed premium of pmed and covers a fraction qmed of medical costs.
3.1.3 Taxation and social transfers
All households pay an income tax that consists of two parts: a progressive tax denoted
by T (yt) and a proportional tax denoted by τ y.
12 The taxable income yt is based on both
labor and capital income. Working households also pay payroll taxes, namely, Medicare
tax (τmed) and Social Security tax (τ ss). The Social Security tax rate for earnings above
yss is zero. The US tax code allows each household to subtract out-of-pocket medical
expenditures that exceed 7.5% of their income when the taxable income is calculated.
In addition, the ESHI premium (p) is excluded from the taxable income for both income
and payroll taxes. Consumption is taxed at a proportional rate τ c.
There is also a public safety-net program, T SIt . The program guarantees that every
household will have a minimum consumption level at c. This reflects the option available
to U.S. households with a bad combination of income and medical shocks to rely on
public transfer programs such as food stamps, Supplemental Security Income, and un-
compensated care. Retired households receive Social Security benefits sse that depend
on educational attainment e.
3.1.4 Optimization problem
Working age households (t < R) The state variables for the working age household’s
optimization problem are capital (kt ∈ K =R
+ ∪ {0}), medical cost shock (xt ∈ X =R
+ ∪ {0}),
idiosyncratic labor productivity (ze,xt ∈ Z =R
+), ESHI offer status (gt ∈ G = {0, 1}), health
insurance status (it ∈ I = {0, 1, 2}), educational attainment (e ∈ E = {1, 2}) and age (t).
In each period, a household chooses consumption (ct), labor supply (lt) , savings
(kt+1) , and health insurance status for the next period (i
′
H). If an individual is eligible
12The progressive part T (yt) approximates the actual income tax schedule in the U.S., whereas the
proportional tax represents all other taxes that are not modeled explicitly.
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for Medicaid, he can receive free public insurance (option M). If he works in a firm
offering ESHI, he can buy a group insurance (G) . In addition, everyone can choose to
be uninsured (U), or buy individual insurance (I). These choices can be summarized as
follows. If an individual is eligible for Medicaid:
i′H =
{
{M, I,G} ; if gt = 1 and lt > 0
{M, I} ; if gt = 0 or lt = 0
}
. (1)
Otherwise
i′H =
{
{U, I, G} ; if gt = 1 and lt > 0
{U, I} ; if gt = 0 or lt = 0
}
. (2)
The value function of a working-age individual can be written as follows:
Vt,e (kt, xt, z
e,x
t , gt, it) = max
kt+1,ct,lt,i′H
u (ct, lt) + βζ tEtVt+1,e
(
kt+1, xt+1, z
e,x
t+1, gt+1,it+1
)
(3)
subject to
kt (1 + r) + w˜ z
e,x
t lt + T
SI
t +Beqe = (1 + τ c) ct+ kt+1 + xt (1− q (xt, it)) + Pt+ Tax (4)
w˜ =
{
w ; if gt = 0
(w − cE) ; if gt = 1
}
(5)
Pt =

0 ; if i′H ∈ {U,M}
pI (xt, t) ; if i
′
H = I
p ; if i′H = G
 (6)
it+1 =

0 ; if i′H = U
1 ; if i′H =M
2 ; if i′H ∈ {I, G}
 (7)
Tax = T (yt)+τ yyt+τmed
(
w˜ze,xt lt − p1{i′H=G}
)
+τ ssmin
(
w˜ze,xt lt − p1{i′H=G}
, yss
)
(8)
yt = rkt + w˜z
e,x
t lt − p1{i′H=G}
−max (0, xt (1− q (xt, it))− 0.075 (w˜z
e,x
t lt + rkt)) (9)
T SIt = max (0, (1 + τ c) c+ xt (1− q (xt, it)) + Tax− w˜z
e,x
t lt − kt (1 + r)−Beqe) . (10)
An individual is eligible for Medicaid if{
ytott ≤ y
cat or
ytott − xt (1− q (xt, it)) ≤ y
need and kt ≤ k
pub
}
ytott = rkt + w˜ z
e,x
t lt
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The conditional expectation on the right-hand side of Equation (3) is over
{
xt+1, z
e,x
t+1, gt+1
}
.
Equation (4) is the budget constraint and Beqe is accidental bequest. In Equation (5),
w is wage per effective labor unit. If the household has an ESHI coverage, his employer
pays a part of his insurance premium. The employer that offers ESHI passes these costs
onto the employees by deducting an amount cE from the wage per effective labor unit,
as shown in (5). 13 Equation (7) maps the current HI choice into the next period HI
status. In Equation (8) , the first two terms are income taxes and the last two terms are
payroll taxes. Note that contributions by both the employer and employee toward the
ESHI premium are excluded from the taxable income.
Retired households For a retired household (t ≥ R), the state variables are capital
(kt), medical expenses shock (xt), educational attainment (e), and age (t).
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Vt,e (kt, xt) = max
kt+1,ct
u (ct, 0) + βζtEtVt+1,e (kt+1, xt+1) (11)
subject to
kt (1 + r) + sse + T
SI
t = (1 + τ c) ct + kt+1 + xt (1− qmed) + pmed + Tax
Tax = T (yt) + τ yyt
yt = rkt + sse −max (0, xt (1− qmed)− 0.075 (sse + rkt))
T SIt = max (0, (1 + τ c) c+ xt (1− qmed (xt)) + Tax+ pmed − sse − kt (1 + r)) .
Distribution of households To simplify the notation, let S define the space of a
household’s state variables, where S = K × Z × X×G × I × E × T for working-age
households and S = K×X×E×T for retired households. Let s ∈ S, and denote by Γ(s)
the distribution of households over the state-space.
3.2 Production sector
There are two stand-in firms that act competitively. Their production functions are
Cobb-Douglas, AKαL1−α, where K and L are aggregate capital and aggregate labor and
A is the total factor productivity. The first stand-in firm offers ESHI to its workers,
but the second one does not. Under competitive behavior, the second firm pays each
13There is evidence that firms shift the costs of employer’s contributions to health insurance to their
workers. Gruber (1994) finds that wages of women of childbearing ages decreased after the maternity
benefits become mandatory part of employer-based health insurance.
14The problem of a newly retired household is slightly different since he is still under insurance coverage
from the previous period. Thus, it is an additional state variable and out-of-pocket medical expenses
are xt (1− q (xt, it)).
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employee his marginal product of labor. Because capital is freely allocated between the
two firms, the Cobb-Douglas production function implies that the capital-labor ratios of
both firms are the same. Consequently, the factor prices are determined as follows:
w = (1− α)AKαL−α, (12)
r = αAKα−1L1−α − δ, (13)
where δ is the depreciation rate.
The first firm must partially finance the health insurance premium for its employees.
The cost is passed on to its employees through a wage reduction. The first firm sub-
tracts an amount cE from the marginal product per effective labor unit. The zero profit
condition implies
cE =
ψp
(∫
1{i′H (s)=G}
Γ (s)
)
∫
ltz
e,x
t 1{gt=1}Γ (s)
. (14)
The numerator is the total contribution toward insurance premiums paid by the first
firm. The denominator is the total effective labor working in the first firm.
3.3 Insurance sector
Health insurance companies in both private and group markets act competitively. The
insurers can observe all state variables that determine the expected medical expenses of
the individuals.15 Based on this assumption and the zero profit conditions, the insurance
premiums can be written in the following way:
pI (xt, t) = (1 + r)
−1γEM (xt, t) + pi (15)
for the non-group insurance market and
p = (1 + r)−1
γ
(∫
1{i′H (s)=G}
EM (xt, t) Γ (s)
)
∫
1{i′H (s)=G}
Γ (s)
(16)
for the group insurance market. Here, EM (xt, t) is the expected medical cost of an
individual of age t with current medical costs xt that will be covered by the insurance
15We assume that an insurance company in the individual market can observe all state variables
relevant to the pricing of insurance, i.e., there is no asymmetric information. Before the ACA reform,
in most states, insurance companies were allowed to do an underwriting when issuing an individual
insurance policy. Moreover, individuals who got seriously ill shortly after obtaining a policy could be
subject to ex-post underwriting that could result in their policy being retroactively canceled if it turned
out that they had concealed some information about their health.
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company:
EM (xt, t) =
∫
xt+1q (xt+1, 2)G(xt+1|xt, t).
γ is a markup on prices due to the administrative costs in the individual and group
markets; pi is the fixed costs of buying an individual policy.16 The premium in the non-
group insurance market is based on the discounted expected medical expenditure of an
individual buyer. The premium for group insurance is based on a weighted average of
the expected medical costs of those who buy group insurance.
3.4 Government constraint
The government runs a balanced budget, which implies∫
[Tax (s) + τ cct (s)] Γ (s)−G = (17)∫
t≥R
[sse + qmedxt − pmed] Γ (s) +
∫
T SIt Γ (s) +
∫
t<R
1{i′H=M}
q (xt, 1)xtΓ (s)
The left-hand side is the total tax revenue from all households net of the exogenous
government expenditures (G). The first term on the right-hand side is the net expen-
ditures on Social Security and Medicare for retired households. The second term is the
costs of guaranteeing the minimum consumption floor for households. The last term is
the cost of Medicaid.
4 Data and calibration
The model is calibrated using nine waves of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS) dataset from 1999 to 2008. The MEPS links people into one household based on
their eligibility for coverage under a typical family insurance plan. This Health Insurance
Eligibility Unit (HIEU) defined in the MEPS dataset corresponds to our definition of a
household. All statistics were computed for the head of the HIEU. The head is defined
as the male with the highest income in the HIEU. If the HIEU does not have a male
member, the female with the highest income is assigned as its head. All the statistics
were computed using the longitudinal weights provided in the MEPS. Because each wave
represents the population each year, the weight of each individual was divided by nine
in the pooled sample.
The sample used for calibration includes all household heads who are at least 24 years
old and have non-negative labor income (to be defined later). All level variables were
16Fixed costs capture the difference in overhead costs for individual and group policies, such as mar-
keting and underwriting costs.
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converted into the price level of year 2002 (our base year) using the Consumer Price
Index (CPI).
In the model, agents are born at the age of 25 and can live to a maximum age of
99. The model period is one year, so the maximum lifespan N is 75. Agents retire at
the age of 65, so R is 41. Tables 2 and 3 summarize the parametrization of the baseline
model. The parameters in Table 2 were set outside the model, and the parameters in
Table 3 were used to match some targets. We describe the calibration in more detail in
Appendix A.
Parameters set outside the model
Parameter name Notation Value Source
Risk aversion σ 5 -
Consumption share κ 0.6 French (2005)
Cobb-Douglas parameter α 0.33 Capital share in output
Labor supply l 0.4 -
Cutoff medical expenses xt 90th percentile -
Consumption floor c $2,700 De Nardi et al. (2010)
Tax function parameters: a0 0.258 Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
a1 0.768 Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
Social Security replacement rates:
Below High-School ss1 40% -
High-School & College ss2 30% -
Insurance loads γ 1.11 Kahn et al. (2005)
Medicaid income threshold:
Medicaid ycat 64% Data
Medically Needy yneed 53% Data
Asset test for Medically Needy kpub $2,000 Data
Medicare premium pmed $1,055 Total premiums =2.11% of Y
Productivity shock:
Persistence parameter ρ 0.98 Heathcote et al. (2010)
Variance of innovations σ2ε 0.018 Heathcote et al. (2010)
Variance of transitory shock σ2ξ 0.10 Erosa et al. (2011)
Table 2: Parameters of the model
5 Baseline model performance
Table 4 compares the aggregate health insurance statistics generated by the model
with the ones observed in the data. The model was calibrated to match the ESHI take-up
rates and individual insurance rates.17 However, the model also produces fractions of the
uninsured and the publicly insured that are close to the data. The last four columns of
Table 4 show insurance statistics by educational groups. The model does not target any
of these statistics, but it still fares well along these dimensions. For each educational
17In this paper, we use the term “take-up rate”only in relation to the employer-based market, and it
defines the fraction of people among those with an ESHI offer who choose to buy group insurance.
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Parameters used to match some targets
Parameter name Notation Value Source/Target
Discount factor β 0.992
K
Y
= 3
Depreciation rate δ 0.07 r = 0.04
Population growth η 1.35% % of people older than 65
Tax function parameter a2 0.652 Balanced government budget
Proportional tax τ y 6.62% Composition of tax revenue
Fixed costs for insurance pi $22.7 % of individually insured
Employer contribution ψ 76.3% ESHI take-up rate
Fixed costs of work Employment profiles
Healthy:
low education φ1(1) 0.2800
high education φ1(2) 0.2650
Unhealthy, low educ: φ2(t, 1)
intercept - 0.0200
slope - 0.0008
Unhealthy, high educ: φ2(t, 2)
intercept - 0.0450
slope - 0.0025
Table 3: Parameters of the model
group, the model also closely tracks the employment and insurance profiles over the life-
cycle for each health group (see Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013) for corresponding
graphs).
All Low education High education
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Insured by ESHI (%) 63.0 64.4 33.3 29.1 68.5 70.6
Individually insured (%) 7.6 7.3 5.5 3.8 8.0 8.0
Uninsured (%) 20.2 19.7 39.5 43.2 16.6 15.6
Publicly insured (%) 9.2 8.6 21.7 23.8 6.9 5.9
ESHI take-up rate (%) 94.3 94.2 85.9 81.6 93.9 95.3
Offer rate (%) 67.6 68.3 38.8 35.7 72.9 74.1
Group premium/avg.income (%) 7.0 6.7 - - - -
Table 4: Insurance statistics: data vs. model
5.1 Price elasticity of demand for group health insurance
In this paper, we study the possible consequences of the tax exclusion reform, so it is
important that the model we use captures the price elasticity of demand for group health
insurance. To compute price elasticity in the model, we consider how much the take-up
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rate changes in response to changes in the ESHI premium and then compute the implied
elasticity.18 We find that the price elasticity in the model is non-linear, i.e., its magnitude
depends on how much we change the ESHI premium compared with the baseline case.
To make our elasticity comparable to micro estimates, we construct experiments in which
we change the premium in the same way as in the studies we consider. More specifically,
Chernew et al. (1997) simulate the change in the take-up rate in response to a 50%
subsidy to the out-of-pocket ESHI premium, and their implied elasticity is -0.072. Based
on the same change in the premium, the model produces an elasticity of -0.11.19 Gruber
and Washington (2005) estimate the sensitivity of the ESHI take-up rate to the share
of after tax employee costs in total premiums.20 They consider the introduction of tax
exclusions of employee’s contributions for federal employees and find an elasticity equal
to -0.02. The policy episode they consider is equivalent to lowering the share of the
employee contribution by approximately 10%. Constructing an equivalent experiment,
we find the elasticity of the take-up rate with respect to the after-tax share of employee
premium to be equal to -0.08. Overall, the elasticities produced by the model are broadly
consistent with the micro estimates.
6 Results
This section is organized as follows. In Section 6.1, we illustrate the role of the
existing tax subsidies in preventing the ESHI pool from unraveling. Next, in Section 6.2,
we construct the following policy experiment: instead of the current tax exclusion, we
introduce an individually-adjusted direct subsidy that only goes to individuals who will
leave the pool if not subsidized. The subsidy scheme in this experiment is comparable
with the simple example in Section 2. Our main goal in constructing this experiment is
to understand how the ESHI take-up and total subsidy spending change compared with
the baseline economy. In Section 6.3, we propose a reform of the current tax subsidy
that aims to mimic the allocation of transfers, as in the case of the individually-adjusted
direct subsidies. The effects of this tax subsidy reform after the implementation of the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) are discussed in Section 6.4. Finally, we discuss the welfare
effects of this tax reform in Section 6.5.
18The elasticity is equal to 100% ∗
∆Takeup
Takeup
/
∆Premium
Premium
.
19In all our experiments, we consider a partial equilibrium environment, i.e., we do not allow the
change in the composition of the ESHI pool to have feedback effects on premiums. We do this to be
consistent with the way the micro studies we consider construct their elasticity.
20This share is defined as
Employee′s contribution− Tax savings
Total premium
. Here, tax savings is the reduc-
tion in tax liability resulting from the tax exclusion of the ESHI premium.
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6.1 The role of the tax exclusion in keeping the ESHI pool
together
To understand the role of the current tax subsidies in keeping the ESHI pool together
we consider an experiment in which the ESHI premium is not excluded from taxable
income. In this case, the total taxable income in equation (9) is determined in the
following way:
yNDt = rkt+w˜z
e,x
t lt+ψp1{i′H=G}
−max (0, xt (1− q (xt, it))− 0.075 (w˜z
e,x
t lt + rkt)) (18)
The total amount of tax is now determined as follows:
TaxND = T
(
yNDt
)
+τ yy
ND
t +τmed
(
w˜ze,xt lt + ψp1{i′H=G}
)
+τ ssmin
(
w˜ze,xt lt + ψp1{i′H=G}
, yss
)
(19)
Note that compared with equations (8) and (9), people who buy ESHI now must count
both the employee’s and employer’s contributions as a part of their taxable income. For
people who do not buy ESHI, the tax code remains the same.
ESI take-up (%) Subsidy Tax rate
All LE HE (% BS) τ y (%)
Baseline 94.2 81.6 95.3 100.0 6.86
1. No tax subsidy 6.3 4.0 6.5 0.0 6.07
2. Differentiated subs. 85.4 53.3 88.1 26.4 5.93
3. Differentiated subs.+age-adjusted CR 90.0 62.6 92.4 16.2 5.66
Table 5: The effect of differentiated direct tax subsidy: the ESHI take-up rates and total spending on
subsidies. LE (HE) denotes groups with low (high) education, BS denotes the baseline.
Employment (%) Insurance (%)
All LE HE Unins Indiv MCD
Baseline 89.7 75.6 92.2 19.7 7.3 8.6
1. No tax subsidy 86.9 74.7 89.2 62.4 22.7 10.8
2. Differentiated subs. 88.8 75.3 91.2 26.3 7.0 9.2
3. Differentiated subs.+age-adjusted CR 88.6 75.4 90.9 23.4 7.1 9.2
Table 6: The effect of differentiated direct tax subsidy: employment and insurance. LE (HE) denotes
groups with low (high) education, BS denotes the baseline.
The first row of Table 5 shows that the elimination of the tax exclusion results in the
unraveling in the employer-based market: the take-up rate drops from 94.2% to 6.3%. At
the same time, the uninsured rate increases to 62.4% (Row 1 of Table 6). This suggests
that tax subsidies are an important mechanism to maintain good risk-sharing in the
employer-based pool.
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It is important to note that there is some evidence that the adverse selection pressure
in community rated markets (especially with voluntary participation) is rather strong.
The first piece of evidence comes from a policy episode in the early 1990s, when sev-
eral states in the US introduced community rating regulations in the individual health
insurance market. Clemens (2014) finds that these restrictions significantly decreased
health insurance coverage and that this coverage decline escalated over several years,
which is consistent with the adverse selection spiral scenario. Moreover, he finds that
the market unraveling stopped once states with the community rating started expanding
Medicaid. This happened because many unhealthy individuals switched from private to
public insurance, resulting in better average health among the remaining participants of
the individual market. The second piece of evidence comes from episodes of the adverse
selection against a specific health insurance plan in the employer-based market. The no-
table case of the complete unraveling happened in the mid-1990s at Harvard University
(for a full description see Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1998). Harvard offered two insurance
plans that significantly differed in their generosity but initially cost almost the same to
employees. In the mid-1990s the premiums of the two plans diverged, which triggered the
adverse selection spiral: more healthy people were choosing the cheaper but less gener-
ous plan, resulting in worse risk composition among those purchasing the more generous
plan, which increased its premium. This trend reinforced itself every year and eventually
the generous plan was disbanded.
It is important to compare out results in Table 5 with Jeske in Kitao (2009), who
also study the effects of the removal of the tax subsidy in the employer-based market.
They find that the elimination of the tax exclusion results in a less dramatic unraveling
of the ESHI market: the take-up rate in their case decreases by approximately 36%. The
key difference between our modeling approach and Jeske and Kitao (2009) is that we
construct a full life-cycle model. In contrast, Jeske and Kitao (2009) use a stochastic
aging framework: individuals can be either young or old. Only young individuals can
work and participate in the employer-based pool, whereas all old individuals are retired
and covered by Medicare. This way, the only difference in the risk of participants in
the ESHI pool is due to health. In our setup, participants in the ESHI pool differ not
only by health but also by age. The average medical spending increases quickly with
age, meaning that cross-subsidization between the young and the old is substantial. Our
simple model in Section 2 shows that the more heterogeneous the pool is, the harder it
is to keep it together. Because having people of different ages in the ESHI pool makes
this pool much more heterogeneous, the removal of the tax subsidy results in a larger
exit from the pool and thus a stronger adverse selection spiral.
To provide the intuition behind our result of the unraveling of the ESHI market,
Figure (5) compares the risk-adjusted premiums in the individual market with the out-
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of-pocket costs of ESHI in the baseline economy. The out-of-pocket costs of ESHI (pOOP )
are defined in the following way:
pOOP = p(1− ψ) + ∆Tax
where p(1−ψ) is the employee’s contribution and ∆Tax is the difference in tax payments
resulting from the purchase of ESHI, ∆Tax = Taxi
′
H
=G−Taxi
′
H
6=G. If the ESHI premium
is excluded from the taxable income, an individual can save on taxes by buying employer-
based insurance, i.e., ∆Tax < 0. If the tax exclusion is removed, an individual buying
ESHI must pay additional taxes because the employer’s contributions are now counted
as taxable income, i.e., ∆Tax > 0.
The difference between the out-of-pocket ESHI costs with and without the tax ex-
clusion is large enough to trigger the adverse selection spiral. As shown in Figure (5),
for young people in the two lowest medical expenses grids (i.e., with medical expenses
less than the 60th percentile), the out-of-pocket costs of ESHI exceed their risk-adjusted
prices in the individual market after the tax subsidy is removed.21 These people initiate
the unraveling by dropping out of the employer-based market, which leads to an increase
in the ESHI premium and a further unraveling of the pool.
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Figure 5: Individual premiums for people in different medical expense grids vs. average out-of-pocket
costs of ESHI with and without tax exclusion. Premiums are normalized by the average GDP per capita.
Another observation from Figure (5) is that for older people and people in the high
medical costs grids (xt = 3, 4, 5), the out-of-pocket costs of ESHI are substantially lower
than their risk-adjusted individual premiums even when the tax exclusion is removed.
These people enjoy large implicit cross-subsidies from people with low expected medical
costs and have incentives to buy ESHI even without tax subsidies. Figure (6) illustrates
21When constructing Figure (5), the premium used to compute pOOP after removing the tax exclusion
is fixed as in the baseline. After the unraveling starts, this price will substantially increase.
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this point further by showing the markup that individuals with different expected medical
costs face in the ESHI pool. The markup is measured as a percentage difference between
the risk-adjusted price in the individual market and the out-of-pocket costs of ESI.22 The
negative markup means that an individual is overpaying compared with his risk-adjusted
price, thus cross-subsidizing other participants in the pool, whereas the positive markup
means that an individual is cross-subsidized. The solid lines in Figure (6) show that the
community rating imposes a large burden on healthy people younger than 35 years old
- their markup can be as high as -250%. In contrast, people over the age of 60 with
bad health enjoy a discount of approximately 90% of their risk-adjusted price when they
participate in the group market. We will explore the possibilities of designing subsidies
that take this cross-subsidization into account in the next section.
30 35 40 45 50 55 60
−250
−200
−150
−100
−50
0
50
100
%
x=1
 
 
One pool
Age pools
30 35 40 45 50 55 60
−250
−200
−150
−100
−50
0
50
100
%
x=2
 
 
One pool
Age pools
30 35 40 45 50 55 60
−250
−200
−150
−100
−50
0
50
100
%
x=4
 
 
One pool
Age pools
30 35 40 45 50 55 60
−250
−200
−150
−100
−50
0
50
100
%
x=5
 
 
One pool
Age pools
Figure 6: Markup for people in different medical expense grids in the ESHI market. The solid lines
are the markup in a single pool in the baseline economy. The dashed lines are the markup in case when
ESHI premiums are age-adjusted.
Another important observation from Tables 5 and 6 is that elimination of the tax
subsidy leads to a significant decrease in employment: the percentage of the working
population decreases from 89.7% in the baseline economy to 86.9% in the economy with-
out the tax subsidy. This happens because in the economy without the tax subsidy, the
22More specifically, the markup is computed as 100% ∗
pI(xt, t)− p
OOP
pI(xt, t)
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employer-based market unravels. ESHI is an important part of compensation for many
people, and its elimination decreases their incentives to work. Feng and Zhao (2014)
explore the interaction between the labor supply and ESHI in detail and find that this
insurance provides an important incentive to work. French and Jones (2011) show that
employer-based health insurance has significant effect on retirement decisions.23
6.2 The effects of direct differentiated subsidies
In this section, we consider an alternative subsidy scheme that only targets people
with weak incentives to participate in the ESHI pool. More specifically, we remove
the tax exclusion of the ESHI premium and introduce a direct differentiated subsidy
instead. This subsidy compensates people with low expected medical costs more because
in the pool, they cross-subsidize people with high expected medical costs. The subsidy
is determined in the following way:
subsi = max
{
0, pOOP −
EM(xt, t)
1 + r
}
.
An individual with a positive subsidy receives a difference between his actuarially fair
price
EM(xt, t)
1 + r
and his out-of-pocket costs of ESHI, pOOP . Note that only individuals
who are likely to leave the pool if they are not subsidized receive a positive subsidy.
The results of the implementation of this subsidy scheme are presented in the second
row of Table 5. The differentiation of the subsidy results in a small decrease in the
take-up rate: from 94.2% to 85.4%.24 At the same time, the total spending on these
direct subsidies represents only 26.4% of the tax expenditures used to keep the ESHI
pool together in the baseline economy.25 In other words, removing the subsidy from
those who have already been cross-subsidized in the pool results in almost the same level
of risk-sharing at one-fourth of the costs.
The left panel of Figure (7) illustrates how the size of the subsidy varies by age and
health. Not surprisingly, people who receive the highest subsidies are those younger than
23It is important to point out that the negative effect of the elimination of ESHI on labor supply
happens despite the fact that the costs of employer’s contributions are fully shifted back to employees.
This is because for some individuals (especially old and unhealthy), health insurance is worth more than
the offset in their wage. Elimination of employer-based insurance decreases their incentives to work
despite the increase in earnings because the total value of their compensation decreases.
24Note that not all individuals are willing to buy health insurance, even at actuarially fair prices. This
happens because health insurance covers only part of the medical costs. At the same time, uninsured
individuals can rely on government means-tested transfers provided through the consumption minimum
floor. Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2015a) illustrate the effect of the consumption floor on the insur-
ance demand in more detail.
25In the baseline economy, the costs to keep the pool together represent the tax revenue forgone
because of the tax exclusion. It is computed as follows:
∫ [
TaxND (s)− Tax (s)
]
Γ (s). In the economy
with the differentiated subsidy scheme, these costs are the direct subsidy spending.
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35 years old and in the lowest medical cost grid (with medical expenses in the bottom
30th percentile of the distribution for each age). These people have the lowest expected
medical expenses and are the most disadvantageous group in the employer-based pool
(see the left panel of Figure (6)); therefore, they should receive the highest compensation.
It is important to note that people over age 55 and those in medical cost grids 4 and 5
(with medical expenses in the top 10 percent of the distribution for each age) never get
subsidized, yet they still remain in the pool. This suggests the inefficiency of uniform
subsidization.
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Figure 7: Differentiated subsidies in the case of one pool (left panel) and age pool (right panel). On
the left panel, the lines for medical cost grids 3, 4, and 5 lie on the horizontal axis. On the right panel,
the lines for medical cost grids 2, 3, 4, and 5 lie on the horizon axis. Subsidies are normalized by the
average GDP per capita.
The left panel of Figure (7) illustrates that young healthy people are the most
“costly”participants in the community-rated pool because they have to be highly sub-
sidized to stay in the pool. This happens because all people face the same premium in
the uniform community rating. Because the expected medical costs increase steeply with
age, this implies a large cross-subsidization from the young to the old. The whole system
of transfers inside this pool can be summarized as follows: the young cross-subsidize
the old, and the government directly subsidizes the young so they will stay in the pool.
In contrast, if the community rating in the ESHI market is age-adjusted, there will be
no cross-subsidization from the young to the old but only from the healthy to the un-
healthy. Because the difference in expected medical costs between healthy and unhealthy
individuals of the same age is smaller than this difference between the healthy young and
the unhealthy old, age-adjusted pools imply less cross-subsidization; thus, less direct
subsidies are needed to maintain a high participation rate in the pool.
In the next experiment, we consider the above differentiated subsidy scheme when
we introduce an age-adjusted community rating in the group market, i.e., we allow the
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ESHI premium to depend on age (but not on the current medical costs) of an individual.
Thus, the ESHI premium in Equation (16) is replaced by an age-dependent premium, as
indicated below:
p
(
t̂
)
= (1 + r)−1γ
(∫
t=t̂
1{i′H (s)=G}
EM (xt, t) Γ (s)
)
∫
t=t̂
1{i′H (s)=G}
Γ (s)
.
The third row in Table 5 shows that the implementation of the differentiated subsidy
scheme together with the age-adjusting community rating results in a take-up rate equal
to 90.0% (compared with 94.2% in the baseline). Importantly, the total spending on
subsidies now represents only 16.2% of the tax expenditures in the baseline economy. In
other words, when cross-subsidization along the dimension of age is removed, it is much
cheaper to maintain good risk-sharing in the employer-based market. The dashed lines in
Figure (6) show that the markup young people face under the age-adjusted community
rating is much lower than that under the uniform community rating. As the right panel
of Figure (7) illustrates, now only people in the lowest medical cost grid (those with
medical expenses in the bottom 30th percentile for each age) can receive a direct subsidy.
The amount of this subsidy increases with age because the expected medical expenses of
people in the first medical cost grid increase much more slowly with age than the average
medical expenses. As they age, people who stay in the lowest medical cost grid need
higher compensation to agree to pool their risks with people in higher medical cost grids.
6.3 Reforming the current tax exclusion of ESHI premiums
The previous section illustrates that we can use direct differentiated subsidies to
maintain good risk-sharing in the employer-based pool at relatively low costs. In this
section, we investigate whether the current tax subsidy can be modified to achieve a
similar outcome. Tax exclusion is a less flexible instrument than direct subsidy. However,
one result from the previous section that can still be applied is that only people with
weak incentives to participate in the ESHI pool should be subsidized. To mimic this
result, we consider a tax subsidy reform that targets only people who receive the direct
subsidy in the experiment described in Section 6.2. At the same time, we remove the tax
exclusion from people who do not receive any direct subsidy.26
The left panel of Figure (7) illustrates that in the direct differentiated subsidy scheme,
two groups are subsidized: people in the lowest medical expense grid (with medical
expenses in the bottom 30th percentile for each age) and younger than 55 years old, and
26In this experiment, the taxable income and tax payments are determined according to Equations (8)
and (9) for the ESHI participants that are allowed to keep the tax exclusion, and according to equations
(18) and (19) for the rest of the ESHI participants.
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ESI take-up (%) Subsidy Tax rate
All LE HE (% BS) τ y (%)
Baseline (pre-ACA economy) 94.2 81.6 95.3 100.0 6.86
1. No tax subsidy 6.3 4.0 6.5 0.0 6.07
Tax subsidy only to a certain group:
2. (xt=1 and age≤55) or (xt=2 and age≤43) 92.5 70.8 94.3 43.9 6.15
3. xt=1 + age-adj CR 97.1 81.3 98.5 34.6 5.89
Table 7: The effects of tax subsidy reforms. LE (HE) denotes groups with low (high) education, BS
denotes the baseline.
people in the second lowest medical expense grid (with medical expense above the 30th
percentile but below the 60th percentile) and younger than 43 years old. To imitate these
results, we consider a policy under which only these two groups are allowed to keep the
tax exclusion. The second row of Table 7 illustrates the effect of this reform (Table 10 in
Appendix B shows the effect on the employment and insurance status). Allowing young
and healthy people to keep the tax exclusion prevents the ESHI pool from unraveling:
the take-up rate is 92.5%, which is only 2% lower than in the baseline. At the same time,
the costs of the tax subsidy go down more than twofold compared with the baseline level
(43.9%).27 Note that even though these savings are considerable, they are not as high
as in the case of direct differentiated subsidies. This happens because the size of the tax
subsidy (unlike the size of the direct subsidy) cannot be adjusted for individual risks.
The left panel of Figure (7) shows that the size of the direct subsidy decreases steeply
with age, and this represents a significant source of savings because older people need
less incentives to join the pool.
The results in Section 6.2 demonstrate that a high participation rate in the ESHI pool
can be achieved at significantly lower costs if the community rating in the ESHI market is
age-adjusted. In the next experiment, we introduce age-adjusted premiums in the ESHI
market. At the same time, we allow only people in the lowest medical expense grid (with
medical expense in the bottom 30th percentile) to keep the tax exclusion because only
this group receives direct subsidies in this case, as shown in the right panel of Figure
(7). Row 3 of Table 7 shows that this reform results in the take-up rate being slightly
higher than the baseline level (97.1%). At the same time, the costs of these tax subsidies
represent only one-third (34.6%) of the baseline level.
27In each experiment considered in Tables 7 and 8, we evaluate the total subsidy spending (or forgone
tax revenue) from
∫ [
TaxND (s)− Tax (s)
]
Γ (s), where the tax parameters are the equilibrium tax rate
in that economy. Note that for individuals who are not allowed to keep the tax exclusion, TaxND = Tax.
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6.4 Elimination of the tax exclusion after the ACA
This section considers the effects of our proposed tax exclusion reform after the im-
plementation of the ACA. The main changes that the ACA introduces to the economy
are as follows. First, there will be an age-adjusted community rating in the individual
market, meaning that premiums can depend only on age but not on the health condi-
tions of individuals. Second, low-income individuals will receive subsidies to buy health
insurance in the individual market. The subsidy will be determined based on a sliding
scale. People with income below 133% of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) will receive
the highest subsidy, but people with income above 400% of FPL will not receive any
subsidy. Third, the income eligibility threshold for the general Medicaid program (ycat)
will increase to 133% of FPL. Fourth, people who remain uninsured will have to pay
penalties. Appendix C details how the ACA changes our baseline model.28
ESI take-up (%) Subsidy Tax rate
All LE HE (% BS) τ y (%)
Post-ACA economy 94.2 75.6 95.9 100.0 6.86
1. No tax subsidy 52.6 31.6 54.4 0.0 5.70
2. No tax subsidy, no penalties 5.3 3.8 5.4 0.0 6.44
Tax subsidy only to a certain group:
3. (xt=1 and age≤55) or (xt=2 and age≤43) 93.6 72.5 95.5 47.0 6.32
4. xt=1 + age-adjusted CR 94.4 74.3 96.2 35.8 6.22
Table 8: The effects of the partial removal of the tax exclusion after the ACA. LE (HE) denotes groups
with low (high) education. Here, BS denotes the baseline for the post-ACA economy.
The first row of Table 8 reports the ESHI take-up rate for the long-run equilibrium
after the implementation of the ACA. Table 11 in Appendix B reports the employment
and insurance statistics. We will use this economy as a reference when comparing the
effect of the tax subsidy reforms after the ACA is implemented. When implementing the
ACA, we assume that all additional government spending needed to pay for subsidies and
expanding Medicaid are financed by increasing the progressive income tax. This increase
disproportionably falls on high-income people to reflect that an important source of
the ACA financing comes from levying higher taxes on the rich. More specifically, we
adjust the parameter a0 of the tax function to balance the government budget during the
implementation of the ACA. As a result, this parameter increases from 0.258 (baseline
level) to 0.285. The resulting average tax rate for a person with average income increases
28In our modeling of the post-ACA economy, we abstract from two provisions of this reform: the limit
on the age-adjustment of premiums in the individual market and the employer mandate. We abstract
from the former provision because there can be multiple equilibriums in the age-adjusted community
rated individual market with limits on the age-adjustment. We abstract from the employer mandate
because it only applies to large firms (more than 50 employees), and in the pre-ACA economy, most of
large firms already offer group insurance (96%).
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by 1.2 percentage points.29
Row 1 of Table 8 shows the effects of the complete elimination of the tax exclusion after
the reform (Table 11 in Appendix B reports the corresponding changes in employment
and insurance). In contrast to the economy before the ACA, removing the tax subsidies
does not lead to the full unraveling of the employer-based pool: the take-up rate only
decreases to 52.6%. Row 2 of Table 8 shows that this high take-up rate is due to the
penalty for being uninsured: if the penalty is removed, the elimination of the tax subsidy
brings the take-up rate down to 5.3%.
Row 3 of Table 8 shows the effects of the reform that allows only two groups to keep
the tax exclusion: people in the lowest medical expense grid (with medical expenses in
the bottom 30th percentile) who are younger than 55 years old, and people in the second
lowest medical expense grid (with expenses between the 30th and 60th percentiles) who
are younger than 43 years old. This tax subsidy reform results in a slightly lower take-up
rate (93.6% compared with 94.2%), but the tax expenditures constitute less than half
(47%) of the post-ACA baseline level.
Row 4 of Table 8 shows the results of targeting the tax exclusion only at people in
the lowest grid of medical expenses combined with age-adjustment of premiums in the
ESHI market. As before, this policy achieves good risk-pooling with the lowest costs:
the take-up rate is the same as in the post-ACA baseline (around 94%), and the tax
expenditures constitute 35.8% of the post-ACA baseline level.
6.5 Welfare effects
The important finding from Sections 6.3 and 6.4 is that the reform that achieves good
risk-sharing in the ESHI market at the lowest costs involves two steps: i) the existing
tax subsidy should be targeted only at low-risk people, and ii) ESHI premiums should
be age-adjusted. This section evaluates the welfare effects of this tax subsidy reform and
compares them with those when the tax exclusion is completely eliminated. Rows 1 and
4 of Table 9 show that the complete elimination of the tax subsidy results in substantial
ex-ante welfare losses, both in the pre-ACA and post-ACA economies: the consumption
equivalent variations (CEV) are equal to -0.46% and -0.36% of the annual consumption,
respectively.30 There is heterogeneity in welfare effects by educational group: people with
high education lose approximately 1% of their annual consumption, whereas people with
29For a full analysis of the effects of the ACA on the economy, see Pashchenko and Porapakkarm
(2013).
30Let V B and V E denote the value function of a newborn in the baseline economy and the experimental
economy, respectively. The CEV can be defined as:
CEV = 100 ∗
[
1−
(
V B
V E
) 1
χ(1−σ)
]
27
low education gain. Many people in the latter group do not have access to the employer-
based market, so they do not suffer from its unraveling. Instead, they can enjoy a lower
tax rate due to lower government tax expenditures.
CEV (%) Subsidy Tax rate ESHI
All LE HE (%BS) τ y(%) Take-up
Before ACA
Pre-ACA baseline - - - 100.0 6.86 94.2
1. No tax subsidy -0.46 0.27 -1.08 0.0 6.07 6.03
Tax subsidy only to a certain group:
2. xt=1 + age-adj CR 0.18 0.41 -0.01 34.6 5.89 97.1
3. xt=1 and income<2*FPL+age-adj CR 0.61 0.79 0.46 42.4 5.89 98.5
After ACA
Post-ACA baseline - - - 100.0 6.86 94.2
4. No tax subsidy -0.36 0.41 -0.98 0.0 5.70 52.6
Tax subsidy only to a certain group:
5. xt=1 + age-adj CR -0.15 0.16 -0.40 35.8 6.22 94.4
6. xt=1 and income<2*FPL+age-adj CR 0.13 0.42 -0.11 42.0 6.23 94.7
Table 9: Ex-ante welfare of newborns for different policy experiments
Rows 2 and 5 of Table 9 show the welfare effects of the tax reform that combines the
age-adjusted community rating in the ESHI market with the removal of the tax exclusion
from all people except those in the bottom 30% of the medical spending distribution
for each age. Before the ACA, this tax subsidy reform brings positive welfare gains
(0.18%), but after the ACA, the welfare effects become negative (-0.15%). In general,
this policy withdraws subsidies from all people whose medical expenses are not in the
bottom 30% of the medical expense distribution, regardless of their income. However,
even though the average income of the ESHI pool participants is relatively high, there
is substantial income heterogeneity. The loss of tax subsidies by low-income individuals
with high medical costs negatively affects welfare. At the same time, the introduction of
age-adjusted premiums in the ESHI market positively affects welfare because it results
in a decrease in ESHI premiums for young people, many of whom have low income.31
Before the implementation of the ACA, the positive welfare effect from age-adjusted
ESHI premiums offsets the negative welfare effect from withdrawing tax subsidies from
low-income individuals. In contrast, after the ACA, the opposite is true because the
tax rate is higher; thus, the size of the tax subsidy is higher as well. Withdrawing this
subsidy from the low-income group yields a more noticeable welfare effect that cannot
be fully offset by the age-adjustment of premiums in the group market.
The resulting number represents the percentage of the annual consumption a newborn in the experimental
economy is willing to give up to be indifferent between the baseline and experimental economies. The
positive number implies welfare gains.
31The introduction of the age-adjusted community rating in the ESHI market in the baseline economy
results in ex-ante welfare gains equivalent to 0.27% of the annual consumption.
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To improve the welfare outcomes, we extend the tax subsidy to people with income
below 200% of FPL. Rows 3 and 6 of Table 9 show the welfare effects of this modified
policy before and after the ACA. Before the ACA, the resulting welfare gains increase to
0.61%, and after the ACA, to 0.13%. However, tax expenditures do not increase much:
before the ACA, the tax expenditures increase from 34.6% to 42.4% of the baseline level,
and after the ACA, from 35.8% to 42.0% of the level of the post-ACA baseline. In other
words, both before and after the ACA, the spending on tax subsidies can be decreased
by almost 60% without unraveling of the employer-based market and without reducing
the welfare. To achieve these results, it is important i) to target tax subsidies at people
with low expected medical expenses and people with low income, and ii) to allow for
age-adjusted premiums in the group market.
6.6 Implementation
The essence of our policy proposal is that instead of subsidizing all people buying
employer-based insurance the tax subsidy should be targeted only at a group of relatively
healthy people. With regard to the implementation of this policy, the question is how
to identify the group of people who should receive the tax subsidy. Our suggestion is to
subsidize people whose current medical expenses are close to zero.32 This approach should
result in very low administrative costs. The ACA requires each individual to obtain
health insurance or pay a penalty. Individuals with insurance must obtain a certificate
from their insurance company confirming that they are insured. For those individuals
who want to receive the tax subsidy, the certificate proving that they are insured can be
combined with a statement of their medical expenses in the current period. 33,34
In general, it is possible to use additional criteria to target people whose presence in
the pool is important to keep the premium low. For example, health insurance companies
providing employer-based insurance accumulate information on the usage of health care
for participating employees. This information can also be used to determine eligibility
for tax subsidies. What we show in this paper is that the total amount of unnecessary
32More specifically, we suggest targeting subsidies at people whose medical expenses are below the
30th percentile of the medical expense distribution of their age. Figure (8) in the Appendix shows that
people in this group have almost zero medical spending over most of their life-cycle.
33In our model, the evolution of health is exogenous and cannot be affected by the behavior of individ-
uals or by investments in health. In this environment, the tax subsidy for employer-based insurance is a
tool to keep the risk pool together and to avoid the adverse selection spiral. Modeling the endogenous
evolution of health is beyond the scope of this paper for computational reasons. However, it is important
to note that in such an environment, a subsidy that is negatively linked to medical spending may have
an additional positive role of promoting healthy behavior.
34It is important to note that in our model, medical spending is exogenous, so we abstract from the
potential role of these types of subsidies on decreasing moral hazard in medical consumption. Pashchenko
and Porapakkarm (2015b) explore the role of moral hazard in medical consumption and discuss possible
ways to decrease it.
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subsidization is quite large and that even targeting subsidies based on a rather rough
risk classification can achieve non-trivial tax savings.35
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the possible reform of the current tax subsidy scheme for
people who buy employer-based health insurance. We show that even though the com-
plete elimination of tax subsidies leads to the unraveling of the employer-based market,
there is room for substantial savings on the tax expenditure by targeting tax subsidies.
We show that good risk-pooling in the employer-based market can be achieved at much
lower costs if the tax code takes into account that people have different incentives to
participate in the employer-based pool. In the employer-based market, high-risk people
receive implicit cross-subsidies from low-risk people and are willing to join the pool even
without any subsidies. In contrast, for low-risk people, the employer-based insurance pool
is less attractive. By building on this intuition, we propose a tax subsidy reform that can
maintain the same level of risk-pooling in the group market as in the baseline economy
but at one-third of the costs. To achieve these results, only people in the bottom 30% of
medical expenses distribution should be allowed to keep the tax exclusion. In addition,
the premiums in the group market should be age-adjusted to remove cross-subsidies from
the young to the old and to make the ESHI pool more attractive for the young. To
improve the welfare outcome of this reform, it is important to extend tax exclusion to
people with income below 200% of FPL, which results in the tax expenditure being equal
to around 40% of the baseline level.
35The suggested subsidy results in an insurance pricing scheme similar to the one used in car insurance.
An insurance company usually reduces the premiums for drivers who do not have accidents in the previous
year.
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Appendix (for online publication)
A Calibration of the baseline model
A.1 Demographics, preferences and technology
The conditional survival probabilities ζt were adjusted for the difference in medical
expenses following Attanasio et al. (2011). The population growth rate was set to 1.35%
to match the fraction of people older than 65 in the data.
The consumption share in the utility function χ is set to 0.6, which is in the range
estimated by French (2005).36 The parameter σ is set to 5, which corresponds to the
risk-aversion over consumption equal to 3.4.37 The discount factor β is calibrated to
match the aggregate capital output ratio of 3. The labor supply of those who choose to
work (l) is set to 0.4
Fixed leisure costs of work φt,e are calibrated to match the employment profiles in
each educational and health group.38 The fixed costs for people in good health φ1(t, e)
are assumed not to vary with age, whereas the additional fixed costs of people with bad
health φ2(t, e) are assumed to be a linear function of age.
39
The Cobb-Douglas function parameter α is set at 0.33, which corresponds to the
capital income share in the US. The annual depreciation rate δ is calibrated to achieve
an interest rate of 4% in the baseline economy. The total factor productivity A is set
such that the total output equals one in the baseline model.
A.2 Insurance status and medical expenditures
In the MEPS, the question about the source of insurance coverage is asked retrospec-
tively for each month of the year. A person is defined as having employer-based insurance
if he reports having ESHI for at least eight months during the year. The same criterion
is used when defining public insurance and individual insurance status.
Medical costs in the model correspond to the total paid medical expenditures in the
MEPS dataset. These include not only out-of-pocket medical expenses but also the
costs covered by insurers. In the calibration, medical expense shock is approximated by
a 5-state discrete Markov process. These 5 states are defined by dividing the medical
36Given that we have an indivisible labor supply, this parameter cannot be pinned down using a
moment in the data.
37The relative risk aversion over consumption is given by −cucc/uc = 1− χ(1 − σ).
38A person is defined as employed if he works at least 520 hours per year, earns at least $2,678 per
year in base year dollars (this corresponds to working at least 10 hours per week and earning a minimum
wage of $5.15 per hour), and does not report being retired or receiving Social Security benefits.
39The fixed costs of work are estimated jointly with the labor income process. The estimation of the
labor income process is explained in more detail in section A.6.
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expenditures for each age into 5 bins, corresponding to the 30th, 60th, 90th and 99th
percentiles. The value of medical expenses in each bin is a coefficient on a corresponding
age dummy in the regression of medical expenses on a set of age and year dummies.
The estimated coefficients were smoothed with a cubic function of age.40 The resulting
profiles are shown in Figure (8).
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Figure 8: Medical expenses for each bin
The parameter xt that separates people into different medical expenses categories is
set to the 90th percentile of medical expenses distribution of the corresponding age. In
other words, people whose medical expenses are in the lowest three bins are classified as
healthy, whereas people whose medical expenses are in the highest two bins are classified
as unhealthy. The transition matrix is constructed by measuring the fraction of people
who move from one bin to another between two consecutive years separately for people
of working age (25-64) and for retirees (older than 65).
The fraction of medical expenses covered by insurance policies q (xt, it) is estimated
based on the MEPS. The fraction of medical spending covered by Medicare qmed is set
to 0.5, following Jeske and Kitao (2009) and Attanasio et al. (2011).
A.3 Government
The tax function T (y) takes the following form, as in Gouveia and Strauss (1994):
T (y) = a0
[
y − (y−a1 + a2)
−1/a1
]
In this functional form, a0 controls the marginal tax rate faced by the highest income
40The MEPS tends to underestimate the aggregate medical expenditures (Sing et al., 2002). To bring
the average medical expenses computed from the MEPS in line with the corresponding statistics in the
National Health Expenditure Account (NHEA), the estimated medical expenses were multiplied by 1.37
for people younger than 75 years old and by 1.93 for people older than 75 years old.
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group, a1 determines the curvature of marginal taxes and a2 is a scaling parameter. The
parameters a0 and a1 are set to the original estimates in Gouveia and Strauss (1994),
which are 0.258 and 0.768, respectively. The parameter a2 is used to balance the govern-
ment budget in the baseline economy. The proportional income tax τ y is set to 6.62%
to match the fact that approximately 65% of tax revenues come from income taxes that
are approximated in the calibration by the progressive function T (y). When considering
policy experiments, we keep a2 as in the baseline economy and adjust τ y to balance the
government budget.
The minimum consumption floor c is set to $2,700, following the estimates of De
Nardi et al. (2010). The Social Security replacement rates were set to 40% and 30% of
the average labor income for people with low and high education, respectively, reflecting
the progressivity of the system.
Medicaid eligibility rules were taken from the data. The income eligibility threshold
for general Medicaid (ycat) is set to 64% of FPL, which is the median value for this
threshold among all states in 2009. The income eligibility threshold for the Medically
Needy program (yneed) and the asset test for this program (kpub) are set to 53% of FPL and
$2,000, respectively. These numbers are equal to the median values for the corresponding
eligibility criteria in 2009 in the states that have the Medically Needy program.
The Medicare, Social Security and consumption tax rates were set to 2.9%, 12.4% and
5.67%, respectively. The maximum taxable income for Social Security is set to $84,900.
The fraction of exogenous government expenses in GDP is 18%.
A.4 Insurance sector
The share of the health insurance premium paid by the firm (ψ) was chosen to match
the aggregate ESHI take-up rate. The resulting number is 76.3%. The proportional loads
for group and individual insurance policies (γ) is set to 1.11 (Kahn et al., 2005). The
fixed costs of buying an individual policy pi is set to $23 to match the aggregate fraction
of people with individual insurance.
A.5 Offer rate
The probability of receiving an offer of ESHI coverage is a logistic function41:
Probt =
exp(ut)
1 + exp(ut)
,
41An individual is defined as having an offer if any member of his HIEU reports having an offer in
at least two of three interview rounds during a year. Household heads whose income was below $1,000
were excluded when estimating the logistic regression.
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where the variable ut is an odds ratio that takes the following form:
ut = η
e
0 + η
e
1 log(inct ) + η
e
2 [log(inct )]
2 + ηe3 [log(inct )]
3 + ηe41{gt−1=1} +Θ
eDt (20)
Here, ηe0, η
e
1, η
e
2, η
e
3, η
e
4 and Θ
e are education-specific coefficients, inct is individual labor
income (normalized by the average labor income), and Dt is a set of year dummy vari-
ables.42,43
A.6 Labor income
Households are divided into two educational groups: high-school dropouts and people
with at least a high-school degree. The fraction of each group in the population is 15%
and 85%, respectively. Individuals with different education and health have different
productivity, which is specified as follows:
ze,xt = λ
e,x
t exp(vt) exp(ξt) (21)
where λe,xt is the deterministic function of age, education and health, and
vt = ρvt−1 + εt, εt ∼ N(0, σ
2
ε) (22)
ξt ∼ N(0, σ
2
ξ)
For the persistent shock vt, ρ is set to 0.98 and σ
2
ε to 0.018 following the incomplete
market literature (Storesletten et al. (2004); Hubbard et al. (1994); Erosa et al. (2011);
French (2005)). The variance of the transitory shock (σ2ξ) is set to 0.1 which is in the
range estimated by Erosa et al (2011).
To identify the deterministic part of productivity λe,xt , we need to take into account
that in the data, we only observe labor income of workers and we do not know the
potential income of non-workers. To address this problem, we use the method developed
by French (2005). We start by estimating the labor income profiles of workers based
on the MEPS dataset. We do this by running a regression of labor income on a set of
age and year dummies to control for time effects.44 Then, we guess λe,xt and feed these
productivity profiles into our model. After solving and simulating the model, we compute
the average labor income profile of workers in our model and compare it with the income
42The model’s counterpart of the variable inct is individual productivity divided by the average pro-
ductivity (ze,xt /z).
43In all experiments, the offer probability is the same as in the baseline. Aizawa and Fang (2012) use
an equilibrium search model to examine how firms offering ESHI would respond if the tax subsidy were
removed. They find only a small change in the equilibrium offer rate.
44Household labor income is defined as the sum of wages and 75% of the income from business.
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profiles estimated from the data. We adjust λe,xt until the labor income profile generated
by our model is the same as in the data for each health group.
B The effect of tax exclusion reform on employment
and insurance statistics
Table 10 shows the change in the insurance and employment behavior as a result of
the tax subsidy reform before the ACA. Table 11 shows these changes after the ACA.
Employment (%) Insurance (%)
All LE HE Unins Indiv MCD
Baseline 89.7 75.6 92.2 19.7 7.3 8.6
1. No tax subsidy 86.9 74.7 89.2 62.4 22.7 10.8
Tax subsidy only to a certain group:
2. (xt=1 and age ≤55) or (xt=2 and age ≤43) 88.9 75.3 91.4 20.8 7.7 9.1
3. xt=1 + age-adj CR 88.9 75.5 91.3 18.1 7.5 9.1
4. xt=1 and income<2*FPL + age-adj CR 89.5 76.3 91.8 17.3 7.3 8.5
Table 10: The effects of tax subsidy reform before the ACA
Employment (%) Insurance (%)
All LE HE Unins Indiv MCD
Post-ACA baseline 89.1 79.8 90.8 8.9 18.5 10.1
1. No tax subsidy 88.3 79.9 89.8 31.1 24.2 10.4
Tax subsidy only to a certain group:
2. (xt=1 and age≤55) or (xt=2 and age≤43) 88.6 79.8 90.1 9.6 18.8 10.3
3. xt=1 + age-adj CR 88.3 79.8 89.8 8.8 19.5 10.1
4. xt=1 and income<2*FPL + age-adj CR 88.6 80.1 90.0 8.6 19.2 10.1
Table 11: The effects of tax subsidy reform after the ACA
C Changes introduced by the ACA
This section describes how the ACA provisions change the baseline model.
C.1 Household problem
After the reform, a working-age household may be subject to penalties if he remains
uninsured or may receive subsidies to buy individual health insurance. In addition, more
households will be eligible for Medicaid. The eligibility for subsidies and the Medicaid
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expansion depends on a household’s total income (ytott ), whereas penalties are a function
of the taxable income (yt). We can rewrite the budget constraint of a working-age
household (4) in the following way:
kt (1 + r) + w˜ z
e,x
t lt + T
SI
t +Beqe + Sub(y
tot
t , i
′
H) = (1 + τ c) ct + kt+1+
xt (1− q (xt, it)) + Pt + Tax+ Pen(yt, i
′
H). (23)
Here Sub(ytott , i
′
H) and Pen(yt, i
′
H) are subsidies and penalties, respectively. A household
with income above 400% of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) cannot receive subsidies.
People having income below 400% of FPL and receiving an ESHI offer are eligible for
premium subsidies in the individual market only if their employee’s contribution (p)
exceeds 9.5% of their total income. The subsidy structure ensures that individuals within
a certain income category do not spend more than a certain fraction of their income on
health insurance. More specifically, spending on individual insurance premiums is limited
to the percentage of total income shown in Table 12.45
Maximum premium spending (% of income) Income categories (% of FPL)
2.0 <133
3.5 133-150
5.2 150-200
7.2 200-250
8.8 250-300
9.5 300-400
Table 12: Maximum spending on individual insurance as a percentage of total income after receiving
subsidies
The income eligibility threshold for the general Medicaid program is increased to
133% of FPL. There are no changes in the Medically Needy program.
An uninsured person whose insurance premium in the individual market is less than
8% of his income must pay a penalty. The penalty is determined by
Pen(yt, i
′
H) = max{0.025yt, $695} if i
′
H = U
C.2 Insurance sector after the reform
The reform imposes a heavy regulation on the individual insurance market. Insurance
companies can no longer condition premiums on the current medical cost of individuals.
45The subsidy function specified in the ACA is slightly more complicated: for each income category, it
specifies the range of maximum premium spending as a fraction of income. We approximate this range
by selecting the midpoint of a corresponding interval. For example, the range for the income category
133-150% of FPL is 3-4%, and we approximate it by the midpoint 3.5%.
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The insurance premium of an individual of age t̂ will be determined by
pI
(
t̂
)
= (1 + r)−1γ
(∫
t=t̂
1{i′H (s)=I}
EM (xt, t) Γ (s)
)
∫
t=t̂
1{i′H (s)=I}
Γ (s)
+ pi.
Thus, after the reform the individual market premium pI will be a function of age only.
C.3 Government constraint
We maintain the assumption that the government runs a balanced budget. This
implies ∫
[Tax (s) + τ cct (s)] Γ (s)−G+
∫
t<R
Pen(yt, i
′
H)Γ (s) =∫
t≥R
[sse + qmed (xt) xt − pmed] Γ (s) +
∫
T SIt Γ (s) +
∫
t<R
1{i′H=M}
q (xt, 1)xtΓ (s)
+
∫
t<R
Sub(ytott , i
′
H)Γ (s)
The left-hand side now has an additional source of revenue - penalties from those unwilling
to purchase insurance. The right-hand side has an additional expenditure - subsidies. To
balance the government budget, we adjust T (yt) to make it more progressive.
46 More
specifically, to achieve a balanced budget in the economy with the ACA provisions in
place, we adjust the parameter a0, which controls the marginal tax rate faced by the
highest income group.
D Computational algorithm
We solved for the steady state equilibrium of the baseline model as follows.
1. Guess an initial interest rate r, price in the group insurance market p, the amount
the firm offering ESHI subtracts from the wage of their workers cE, tax parameter a2,
and bequest Beqe.
47
46More specifically, the reform increases the hospital insurance payroll tax on people with income
above $200,000 by 0.9% and imposes a 3.8% tax on unearned income for higher-income tax-payers
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011). Our calibration strategy assumes a standard log-normal income
process commonly used in the macro-literature, which cannot generate the empirical fraction of top
earners. Because of this, we increase the progressivity of the general tax code to capture the main idea
of financing the reform by taxing the rich more.
47In general, insurance markets in which firms are not allowed to risk-adjust premiums, as in the group
market, can have multiple equilibriums. However, because the major part of the premium is contributed
by the employer, people are less sensitive to the price of insurance; thus, the multiplicity of equilibriums
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2. Solve for the households’ decision rules using backward induction. We evaluate the
value function for points outside the state space grid using a Piecewise Cubic Hermite
Interpolating Polynomial (PCHIP).
3. Given the policy functions simulate the households distribution using a non-
stochastic method, as in Young (2010).
4. Using the distribution of households and policy functions, check whether the mar-
ket clearing conditions and zero profit conditions for insurance firms hold, and whether
the government budget balances. If not, update r, p, cE , a2, and Beqe, and repeat Steps
1-3.
The computation of the steady-state for the reformed economy is complicated by the
fact that we now need to compute additional 40 prices (for each working age) in the
individual community-rated market. We modified the algorithm above by guessing these
40 prices at Step 1 and updating them at Step 4.
becomes less of an issue. In particular, our equilibrium price tends to be invariant to the initial guess.
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